

Message Text

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FM US REP MBFR

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 19 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE LAST PLENARY MEETING OF THE FIFTEENTH ROUND OF
THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS HELD ON JULY 19,
SOVIET REP (TARASOV) AND US DEPREP DELIVERED THE ONLY
STATEMENTS. THE US PRESENTATION IS BEING REPORTED
SEPTEL. TARASOV OPENED HIS STATEMENT WITH RELATIVELY
UPBEAT ASSESSMENT OF IMPROVED PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS
AS A RESULT OF RECENT EVENTS. IN THIS CONTEXT,
SOVIET REP MADE A BRIEF, POSITIVE REFERENCE TO THE
APRIL 19 WESTERN INITIATIVE, BUT NOTED THAT THE
WEST STILL UNACCEPTABLY SOUGHT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES.
TARASOV PROCEEDED TO GIVE MAJOR CREDIT FOR THE
IMPROVEMENT TO THE EAST'S JUNE 8 PROPOSALS. SOVIET
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REP TOOK AN EXTREMELY TOUGH LINE ON THE DATA ISSUE,
WHICH, HE CHARGED, WAS BEING MANIPULATED BY CERTAIN
CIRCLES IN NATO COUNTRIES TO COMPLICATE AND
POSSIBLY EVEN DISRUPT THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE CALLED THE
WESTERN ASSERTION OF A LARGE EASTERN MILITARY MANPOWER
SUPERIORITY A QUOTE MYTH UNQUOTE AND CITED WESTERN
REFUSAL TO DATE TO SUBMIT WESTERN ESTIMATES FOR THE

FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
AND TO EXCHANGE AVERAGE MANNING LEVEL DATA AS
CALLING INTO QUESTION WESTERN INTEREST IN ESTABLISHING
THE REAL FACTS OF THE SITUATION. SOVIET REP ALSO
USED POLEMICAL TERMS IN REVIVING EASTERN COMPLAINTS
ABOUT THE NEUTRON WARHEAD. TARASOV CONCLUDED BY
QUOTING GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV TO THE EFFECT
THAT THE EAST HAS MOVED MORE THAN HALFWAY TOWARDS
REASONABLE COMPROMISE AND THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A
FORCE REDUCTION AGREEMENT IS NOW A MATTER OF WESTERN
POLITICAL WILL. AT END OF HIS OWN PRESENTATION, WHICH FOLLOWED
SOVIET PRESENTATION, US DEPREP COMMENTED ON
TARASOV'S MENTION OF THE ER/RB WEAPON. TARASOV REPLIED BY
CLAIMING THE RIGHT TO RAISE ANY TOPIC BEARING ON THE RELATIONSHIP
OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE FULL
RUSSIAN TEXT OF THE SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT FOLLOWS BELOW:

BEGIN TEXT:

1. THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DISARMAMENT,
REFLECTING THE VITAL CONCERN OF ALL PEOPLES TO SECURE A
PEACEFUL FUTURE, EMPHASISED IN ITS FINAL DOCUMENT THE PRESSING
NEED TO GET DOWN TO THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY THROUGH DISARMAMENT
AND NOTED THAT " THE TASK OF LIMITING THE ARMS RACE WOULD BE
FACILITATED BY THE EARLIEST AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE
APPROPRIATE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE ALREADY TAKING PLACE AT
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VARIOUS LEVELS."

2. THE UN MEMBER STATES THUS ALSO ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO US
CALLING UPON US TO AGREE MORE QUICKLY ON THE REDUCTION OF
MILITARY TENSION IN THE CENTRE OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT AND ON
REDUCING THE LEVEL OF CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND
ARMAMENTS IN THIS REGION.

3. ONE CAN NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT IN RECENT TIME A
CERTAIN TURN FOR THE BETTER HAS OCCURRED IN THE VIENNA
NEGOTIATIONS. OF COURSE, THE POSITIONS OF THE SOCIALIST AND THE
WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE STILL NOT NEAR AND DO NOT COINCIDE.
HOWEVER, WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN ACHIEVING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
ON A WHOLE SERIES OF PROBLEMS WHICH EVEN QUITE RECENTLY SEEMED
ALMOST UNRESOLVABLE.

4. THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION IN BRINGING AOUT SUCH A TURNING
POINT HAS BEEN MADE BY THE SOCIALIST STATES. THEIR NEW PROPOSALS
OF 8 JUNE OF THIS YEAR ARE CHARACTERISED BY A BREADTH OF SCALE,
BY THE WIDE NUMBER OF QUESTIONS INCLUDED IN THEM, BY THE ACCOUNT
TAKEN OF MANY SUBSTANTIAL POINTS IN THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN
COUNTRIES AND BY THE DESIRE TO SEARCH FOR SENSIBLE COMPROMISE.

THE INITIATIVE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, WHICH REGULATES IN A DETAILED WAY THE METHOD OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND THE LIMITATIONS WHICH MUST BE ESTABLISHED FOR THEM IN THE SUBSEQUENT PERIOD, FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE EQUALITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS OF THE AGREEMENT, THE MUTUALITY OF THEIR RIGHTS AND COMMITMENTS AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL SIDES.

5. THE PROPOSALS OF THE WESTERN STATES OF 19 APRIL THIS YEAR ALSO HAD A CERTAIN POSITIVE SIGNIFICANCE. ALTHOUGH THESE PROPOSALS

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ARE MORE MODEST IN THE SCOPE OF PROBLEMS INCLUDED AND, ON THE WHOLE, ARE BASED, AS BEFORE, ON THE DESIRE BY THE WEST TO ACHIEVE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES, THEY NEVERTHELESS REPRESENT A CERTAIN STEP TOWARDS THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES.

6. MAKING AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE 15TH ROUND DURING WHICH THE NEW PROPOSALS OF BOTH SIDES HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED, WE CAN BOLDLY ASSERT THAT IT WAS CHARACTERISED BY ITS CONTENT AND RESULTS. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT OVER THE ENTIRE PREVIOUS PERIOD OF MORE THAN 4 YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS THE PARTICIPANTS SUCCEEDED ONLY IN AGREEING UPON TWO POINTS: THAT THE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN TWO STAGES AND THAT ONLY THE FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE USA SHOULD BE REDUCED IN THE

FIRST STAGE. DURING THE COURSE OF THE 15TH ROUND THE SERIES OF POINTS ON WHICH MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN ACHIEVED HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY EXTENDED.

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-PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE AGREED THAT THE REDUCTION IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE LIMITED TO GROUND FORCES.

-THERE IS A SINGLE OPINION REGARDING THE FACT THAT THE REDUCTION OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE USSR AND THE USA BOTH IN THE FIRST AND IN THE SECOND STAGES WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN PROPORTION TO THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH.

-ON SIGNING AN AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST STAGE, THE USSR AND THE USA WILL EXCHANGE LISTS IN WHICH WILL BE INDICATED THE DESIGNATION, THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND THE LOCATION OF THE FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUB-UNITS SUBJECT TO THE REDUCTION.

-THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMAMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE USA IN THE FIRST STAGE WILL BE CARRIED OUT ON A SELECTIVE BASIS.

-LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS BELONGING TO THE USSR AND THE USA AFTER THEIR REDUCTION WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR CONCRETE, PREVIOUSLY AGREED TYPES OF ARMAMENTS.

-THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT NOT ONLY THE USSR AND THE USA BUT ALSO ALL OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PART IN REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCES.

-THE USSR AND THE USA WILL BEGIN REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST STAGE AND COMPLETE THEM IN THE SECOND WHILE THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS OF THEIR OWN GROUND FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE.

- MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REACHED CONCERNING THE FACT THAT THE REDUCTION OF THE GROUND FORCES OF ALL
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DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL BE CARRIED OUT AND COMPLETED IN DEFINITE AGREED TIME PERIODS.

- IT HAS BEEN DECIDED THAT, IN THE OUTCOME OF THE REDUCTION, EQUAL LEVELS IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE

ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND THE WARSAW PACT
COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WILL BE ESTABLISHED.

- THERE IS ALSO AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE CONCRETE
SIZES OF THESE LEVELS NAMELY THAT THE OVERALL
NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES
ON EACH SIDE WILL NOT EXCEED 900,000 MEN AND THE
NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE GROUND FORCES - 700,000
MEN.

- THE ABOVE-MENTIONED LEVELS IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH
OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES
WILL HAVE A COLLECTIVE CHARACTER WHICH WILL ALLOW
THEIR EQUALITY TO BE MAINTAINED IN THE CASE OF A
UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTION IN THE FUTURE BY ONE OR SEVERAL
PARTICIPANTS OF EITHER OF THE PARTICULAR MILITARY
POLITICAL ALLIANCES.

- ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL
NOT INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR GROUND
FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IN THE PERIOD
FROM THE SIGNING OF THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT UP
UNTIL THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE AGREED EQUAL COLLECTIVE
LEVELS.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

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7. IT IS ALREADY CLEAR FROM THIS THAT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CAPABLE OF FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS ON MANY EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND COMPLEX PROBLEMS. SUCH SOLUTIONS ARE ACHIEVED WHEN ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOW A WILLINGNESS TOWARDS COMPROMISE AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF EACH OTHER.

8. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE SOCIALIST AND THE WESTERN STATES MAKE THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH I HAVE REFERRED TO DEPENDENT ON A SERIES OF CONDITIONS AND PUT FORWARD THEIR OWN UNDERSTANDING OF WAYS PRACTICALLY TO IMPLEMENT THEM. THEREFORE WE ARE FAR FROM BEING ABLE TO DEPICT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A ROSY LIGHT. MANY DIFFICULTIES STILL REMAIN TO BE OVERCOME IN THE PATH TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT.

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9. THE SOCIALIST STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS BEFORE, SEE THEIR TASK IN GUARANTEEING THE WORKING OUT OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE THE MAXIMAL AND MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO MILITARY DETENTE, WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE PRESENT DANGEROUS LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION OF THE TWO GROUPINGS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND WHICH WOULD FACILITATE THE MOST FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR ACCEPTING IN THE FUTURE FURTHER MEASURES FOR LIMITING AND CURBING THE ARMS RACE AND STRENGTHENING THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN STATES AND PEOPLES.

10. STRIVING TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS - AND THIS, AS FAR AS WE UNDERSTAND IT WOULD OBJECTIVELY ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF ALL STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS - THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE FUTURE AGREEMENT MUST GUARANTEE THE EQUALITY OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITHOUT ANY DISCRIMINATION WHATSOEVER, MUST ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY OF COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN BY THEM AND MUST NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY COUNTRY.

B. THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF THE STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING MUST BE CONDUCTED NOT IN A FORMAL AND SYMBOLIC WAY BUT RATHER IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SECURE A REAL REDUCTION IN THEIR MILITARY POTENTIALS. THIS

CAN BE ACHIEVED IF THE REDUCTIONS ARE CARRIED OUT BY ENTIRE MILITARY ENTITIES - FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUB-UNITS AND NOT BY THE DISCHARGE OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICEMEN.

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C. ALL STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING MUST REDUCE THEIR FORCES NOT ARBITRARILY BUT APPROXIMATELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH THEY HAVE AT PRESENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

D. ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THE AGREEMENT MUST TAKE PART NOT ONLY IN THE REDUCTION OF THEIR GROUND FORCES BUT ALSO IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. WITHOUT THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SECURE GENUINELY EFFECTIVE MILITARY DETENTE AND TO DECREASE THE TENSION IN THE CENTRE OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. WE ARE OBLIGED TO DO THIS BY THE VERY SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WAS AGREED UPON IN JUNE 1973.

E. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CATEGORIC REFUSAL OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO REDUCE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE PERSONNEL OF AIR FORCES, AN AGREED UPPER MAXIMUM LEVEL MUST BE ESTABLISHED WHICH IS EQUAL BOTH FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES AND FOR THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT.

F. TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF CERTAIN STATES' USING THE COLLECTIVE LEVELS FOR RE-ESTABLISHING OR, EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, EXCEEDING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH THEY HAD BEFORE THE REDUCTION AS A RESULT OF A REDUCTION IN THE FORCES OF THEIR ALLIES. THE NECESSITY FOR THIS FOLLOWS ALREADY FROM THE FACT THAT IN THE OPPOSITE CASE THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE VIOLATED.

G. TO WORK OUT, WITHIN THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES, A MECHANISM FOR MAINTAINING THE COLLECTIVE LEVELS WHICH, WHILE ALLOWING NECESSARY CORRECTIONS IN THE NUMERICAL

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STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF ONE OR ANOTHER STATE AFTER THEIR REDUCTION, AT THE SAME TIME WOULD NOT ALLOW, IN A CARDINAL WAY, THE CHANGING OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES ESTABLISHED IN CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE STATES PARTICIPANTS OF THE AGREEMENT. SUCH A MECHANISM WOULD PREVENT ANY DESTABILISATION OF THE SITUATION IN THIS REGION OF THE WORLD SINCE SUCH DESTABILISATION WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR ALL STATES REPRESENTED IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND PARTICIPANTS WITH SPECIAL STATUS ALIKE.

11. SECURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE JUST AND WELL FOUNDED PROPOSALS, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE NOT SEEKING FOR THEMSELVES ANY KIND OF UNILATERAL GAIN OR ADVANTAGE. OUR WESTERN PARTNERS WILL NOT FIND IN THEM ANY OBLIGATIONS OR LIMITATIONS WHICH WE WOULD ASK THEM TO ASSUME AND WHICH AT THE SAME TIME WE WOULD

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REFUSE TO ASSUME OURSELVES. ALL OF THESE PROVISIONS ARE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF FULL EQUALITY, MUTUALITY OF RIGHT AND OF OBLIGATION, DIMINISHING THE SECURITY OF NEITHER OF THE SIDES.

12. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE SPOKEN OUT AND WILL CONTINUE TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST ANY OBLIGATIONS WHICH FORMALLY OR IN FACT WOULD DEMAND LARGER LIMITATIONS ON THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THAN ON THE NATO STATES. FOR ALL THIS WE HAVE RATHER WEIGHTY GROUNDS OF AN

HISTORICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL AND EVEN MORAL SORT.
IN THEIR PROPOSALS OF 8 JUNE OF THIS YEAR, THE
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TOOK THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE
WESTERN STATES INTO ACCOUNT TO THE GREATEST EXTENT
POSSIBLE, TOOK A MAJOR COMPROMISE STEP TOWARD THE
WISHES WHICH WERE EXPRESSED BY THEM DURING THE COURSE
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ACTIONS OF EQUIVALENT IMPORTANCE
FROM THE WESTERN SIDE STILL HAVE NOT BEEN MADE.

13. DESPITE CERTAIN PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE GREETED
US DURING THE DISCUSSION OF UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS, IT
IS POSSIBLE TO SAY WITH ASSURANCE THAT IF THE WESTERN
COUNTRIES APPROACH THEIR SOLUTION FROM A POSITION
OF REALISM, OF GENUINE MUTUALITY EXCLUDING THE SECURING
BY ANY STATE OF ONE SIDED ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF
THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER, IF THEY, LIKE THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES, WILL BE GUIDED BY THE INTERESTS OF GENUINE
MILITARY DETENTE, THEN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS CAN IN THE
NEAREST FUTURE ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS.

14. ONE OF THE MOST COMPLICATED QUESTIONS IS THE QUESTION
OF NUMERICAL DATA. ALTHOUGH THIS QUESTION WAS ARTIFICIALLY
CREATED BY UNJUSTIFIED ASSESSMENT BY THE WEST, IT REMAINS
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ON THE AGENDA OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND IT MUST BE SOLVED.
THE PRE-CONDITION IN THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL 1978,
THAT AGREEMENT ON NUMERICAL DATA WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED, LED
TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVING TO MAKE THEIR OWN PROPOSALS
OF 8 JUNE CONDITIONAL UPON THE NECESSITY OF THE WEST
RECOGNIZING THE REAL FACT OF THE EXISTENCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE
OF APPROXIMATE EQUALITY OF THE FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF
NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY. WITHOUT THE RECOGNITION OF THIS
REALITY, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO COUNT ON THE FULFILLMENT OF
THOSE TASKS WHICH WERE SET FOR THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, AND
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SECURE A GENUINELY EFFECTIVE AND JUST
REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

15. UNFORTUNATELY, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO IGNORE THE FACT THAT,
IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF NATO, THERE ARE CIRCLES WHICH ARE
ATTEMPTING TO USE THE ISSUE OF FIGURES, FOR COMPLICATING THE
SOURCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, PROLONGING THEM, AND EVEN
DISTRUPTING THEM.

16. THE EXCHANGE OF OFFICIAL FIGURES IN 1976,
THE PRESENTATION BY THE SIDES OF ADDITIONAL, RATHER
BROAD NUMERICAL DATA IN MARCH AND APRIL OF THIS
YEAR, THEIR LONG AND RATHER DETAILED EXAMINATION HAS
UNDERLINED SUFFICIENTLY CLEARLY THAT THE WEST HAS
NO BASIS TO MAKE ASSERTIONS ABOUT ANY KIND OF

DISPARITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE
FORCES OF THE SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ATTEMPTS
OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO FIND SOME SORT OF
CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE EARLIER AND THE MORE
RECENT POSITIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, WHICH
MIGHT BE EVIDENCED BY SAYING THAT, AT ONE STAGE,
THE SOCIALIST STATES HAD ALLEGEDLY RECOGNISED A
SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE

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FORCES FOR THEMSELVES, WERE ALSO NOT CROWNED WITH
SUCCESS. THE 150,000 MILITARY SERVICEMEN WHICH THE
EAST ALLEGEDLY HAS HIDDEN FROM THE WEST; THIS IS
NOT A NEEDLE IN A HAYSTACK. IF THEY HAD REALLY
EXISTED, THEN AFTER THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF
OF CAREFUL SEARCHING, IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
A BIG JOB FOR THE WEST TO REVEAL THEM AND PROVE THEIR
PRESENCE. THE ABSENCE OF RESULTS OF THESE SEARCHES ONLY
UNDERLINES THAT THEY ARE AIMED AT AN UNREALISTIC
OBJECTIVE, OR THAT THE WEST IN ITS CALCULATIONS
HAS GONE FAR BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREED
CRITERIA FOR COUNTING.

17. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE MORE THAN
ONCE, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THEIR POSSIBILITIES,
ATTEMPTED TO HELP THE WEST IN THE SOLUTION OF THE

PROBLEMS WHICH WERE CREATED BY THEM.
THEY RECOMMENDED TO THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS A
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SERIES OF METHODS WHICH COULD HELP THE SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH, THEY ASKED THE WEST TO STATE ITS FIGURES ON THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL SOCIALIST STATES, THEY PROPOSED THE EXCHANGE OF DATA ON THE AVERAGE MANNING LEVELS OF THE FORCES OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT. HOWEVER, THESE REQUESTS AND PROPOSALS UP TILL NOW HAVE BEEN TURNED DOWN BY THE WEST. THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER CERTAIN WESTERN STATES ARE INTERESTED IN GENERAL IN FINDING THE TRUTH, OR IS IT SIMPLY MORE CONVENIENT FOR THEM FOR SOME REASON ARTIFICIALLY TO KEEP UP THE MYTH ABOUT A MAJOR SUPERIORITY OF THE EAST, AND TO CONTINUE TO INTIMIDATE EUROPE WITH NOTORIOUS FLIGHTS OF FANCY ABOUT THE SO-CALLED "SOVIET THREAT"?

18. RECENTLY THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO OUR NEGOTIATIONS HAVE INCREASINGLY ACTIVELY MOVED INTO THE FIRST PLACE THE SO-CALLED "GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR". THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO SHOW IN FACT THAT BECAUSE THE USSR IS LOCATED CLOSER TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS THAN THE USA, IT FOLLOWS THAT INDEPENDENT OF THE REAL FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE GIVEN ARE, THE EAST NEVERTHELESS MUST UNDERTAKE REDUCTIONS WHICH ARE LARGER IN SIZE THAN THOSE OF THE WEST. SUCH ARGUMENTS SHOW EVEN MORE, ALTHOUGH IN AN INDIRECT WAY, THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN REALITY DO NOT THEMSELVES SEE ANY SORT OF SERIOUS DISPARITIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER, OFFICIAL LEADERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATO COUNTRIES HAVE OFTEN OPENLY DECLARED THAT, BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW TREATY ON THE ONE SIDE, AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES ON THE OTHER, THERE EXISTS
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AN EQUILIBRIUM IN ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA, MR. CARTER, NOT LONG AGO SAID: "BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIET UNION THERE EXISTS AN EXCEPTIONAL STABILITY IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS AND IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE".

BUT, IF THERE EXISTS EXCEPTIONAL STABILITY IN THE
RELATIONSHIP OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE
BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPINGS, ONE CAN ASK WHY THE
WESTERN DELEGATIONS REFER TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL
PROPINQUITY OF THE USSR TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS,
AND HOW THIS FACTOR CAN INFLUENCE THE SECURITY OF
THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES WHICH ARE LOCATED IN
CENTRAL EUROPE? THERE CAN ONLY BE ONE ANSWER HERE:
THE MILITARY CIRCLES OF NATO ARE LOOKING FOR ANY
ARTIFICIAL PRETEXT IN ORDER TO GET, IN ANY WAY
WHATSOEVER, ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS, ON ORDER TO
GET FOR THEMSELVES UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

MR CHAIRMAN

19. AS WE HAVE OBSERVED ABOVE, THROUGH THE
EFFORTS OF THOSE STATES WHICH ARE REALLY INTERESTED
IN THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, NOT A SMALL
MEASURE OF AGREEMENT WOULD ALREADY HAVE BEEN REACHED.
WE HAVE NOT PASSED OVER IN SILENCE ALSO THE SERIES
OF PROBLEMS WHICH STILL STAND BEFORE US. NOW, AT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 6 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0450

THIS CRITICAL MOMENT, THE QUESTION IS THE FOLLOWING:
EITHER TO BUILD UP THE POSITIVE POINTS ACHIEVED IN

OUR WORK, TO SEARCH PERSISTENTLY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE REMAINING PROBLEMS AND TO ACHIEVE A WIDENING OF THE AREA OF AGREEMENT, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO DISCARD WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED, TO TURN EXISTING DIVERGENCIES INTO AN UNCROSSABLE BARRIER, AND TO DERAIL NEGOTIATIONS. THE DELEGATION OF THE USSR FIRMLY HOPES THAT THE PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS BOTH IN EASTERN AND IN WESTERN EUROPE WILL CHOOSE THE ROAD WHICH LEADS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WILL NOT TOLERATE THAT THE CIRCLES WHICH ARE THE ENEMIES OF EUROPEAN DETENTE COULD GIVE AN IRREPARABLE SHOCK TO THIS HISTORIC BEGINNING.

20. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SOVIET DELEGATION CONSIDERS IT ITS DUTY TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS TO THE FACT THAT CERTAIN
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FORCES IN NATO ARE AGAIN ACTIVATING PLANS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE OF NEW FORMS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, PARTICULARLY OF NUCLEAR NEUTRON WEAPONS. THE REALISATION OF THESE DANGEROUS PLANS, AS WE HAVE ALREADY PREVIOUSLY UNDERLINED, WOULD NOT ONLY SERIOUSLY COMPLICATE THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WOULD LEAD IN GENERAL TO A DESTABILISATION OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN THIS REGION, WILL INTENSIFY THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND WILL HINDER THE GROWTH OF POSITIVE PROCESSES IN EUROPE.

21. NOW, WHEN THE STRUCTURE OF DETENTE, BUILT OVER A LONG TIME IS UNDERGOING THREATS TO ITS STABILITY, THE QUESTION OF WHAT FATE WILL BEFALL THE NIENNA NEGOTIATIONS PLAYS AN ENORMOUS ROLE FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF ALL EUROPEAN STATES, FOR THEIR SECURITY, FOR UNIVERSAL PEACE.

22. THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS OF THOSE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES WHICH ARE NOT USING THE PRESENT MOMENT FOR STRENGTHENING AND DEEPENING THE POSITIVE CHANGES FOR THE BETTER IN THE TALKS, OR EVEN FORESEEING ACTIONS THREATENING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE VERY CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE ASSUMING A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE HISTORY. THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, L I BREZHNEV, SAID ON 25 JUNE OF THIS YEAR: "THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES RECOMMEND A REASONABLE REALISTIC COMPROMISE TO THEIR PARTNERS. IN TNTRODUCING THEIR PROPOSAL, THEY HAVE GONE MORE THAN THEIR HALF

OF THE WAY. WE TURN TO THE NATO COUNTRIES: LET US
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FINALLY, GET DOWN TO WORK. THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT,
UNCONDITIONALLY, ALREADY EXISTS. HOW EVERYTHING
DEPENDS ON THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE WEST."

END TEXT

TARASOV MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENT FOLLOWING US DEPREP'S
PRESENTATION:

BEGIN TEXT:

IN CONNECTION WITH THE REMARKS MADE BY THE HEAD OF THE
DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE END OF HIS SPEECH, I WOULD
LIKE TO SAY THAT, ALTHOUGH AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS THE QUESTION OF
NEUTRON ARMAMENTS IS NOT BEING DISCUSSED, EVERYTHING CONNECTED
WITH THE RELATIONSHIP OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL
EUROPE HAS A DIRECT RELEVANCE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. AT A TIME WHEN
WE ARE DISCUSSING MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS,
IT IS NATURAL THAT ANY PLANS TO INCREASE ARMAMENTS BY ONE OF THE
SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE, A DIRECT
INFLUENCE ON THE STATE OF PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IN
THIS CONNECTION THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS CONSCIOUSLY DRAWN THE
ATTENTION OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO THE FACT
THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL ARMAMENTS OF A NEW KIND IN
THIS AREA WOULD NATURALLY COMPLICATE CONSIDERABLY OUR NEGOTIA-
TIONS. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

END TEXT.DEAN

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